

**RECENT RIOTS & POLICE RESPONSE**

**A STUDY TO IMPROVE POLICE CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH MOBS/ RIOTS**



**April 29, 2021**

**“The first duty of a Government is to maintain Law and Order, so that the life, property and religious beliefs of its subject are fully protected.”**

(Jinnah)

1. **PRELUDE**

**“Fish die when they are out of water, and people die without law and order”**

(The Talmud)

Law and order can be an issue wherever community lives. In our part of the world riots during protests are becoming a norm. Hence it is imperative that police department builds its capacity to professionally response to avert collateral damages besides safeguarding its constabulary.

There is no doubt Police has been successfully handling on daily basis numerous protests rallies. However at times as they respond due to capacity issue or due to some political expediency or due to leadership/force non cogent applications they are criticized and become liable of their doings.

Religious and motivated protests are a real challenge. They are very difficult to handle as many other stakeholders have their axe to grind with police becoming scapegoats. State relationship with home grown militant groups since the 1980s has undergone various phases, arguably agreed now, that it has brought no beneficial outcomes.

Poor intelligence, imbibed with lack of will, ability and building capacity has resulted in mishandling protests rallies. Besides timidity, partisanship and not following due process by gearing up for intense occasions gives undesirable results.

Similarly not regularly assessing its human resource potential, not inspecting riots gears and not carrying simulation drills comes as bombshell at crucial hors. Leadership lackluster assertions to give a correct picture to Government or superiors and playing to gallery have cost many PSP and ranks there life and career beside bringing bad name to service and not to underscore citizens deaths and collateral loss.

1. **INTRODUCTION**

Traditionally law and order was divided into the following segments:

1. Political
2. Religious
3. Labor
4. Urban Unions of Traders and Students

Since the rise of sectarian politics, violence is norm of protest. Police is facing this situation since early 90s but unfortunately serious attention has not been paid towards training and conduct in the midst of dangerous conflict and confrontation. There is need to sensitize police about highly inflammable religiously sectarian mobs.

Past years protests studies give some interesting trends, of the group’s involvement and methods employed by them. Some make sit-in involving women folk, some make road blocks, shutter down, *dharna* and long march whereas religious groups like TLP violently force their perspective truths.

The protests were generally unruly to the extent of throwing stones and bricks on police. Rarely lethal weapons were used. Good coordination among stakeholders streamlined route and timings, with mutual consent, enabling a predictable contingency and security plans.

Now things have changed. In sudden eruption due to any happening mass movements, arsons, lootings become norms. TLP is one such party, emerging as third largest in country who violently advocates its ideology.

1. **CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT TLP PROTEST**

Recent TLP protests was a series of protests and strikes in Pakistan held from 11–20 April 2021. Mass protests first erupted after a series of calls for nationwide rallies and picketing against the government of Prime Minister Imran Khan and his cabinet, orchestrated by far-right party *Tehreek-e-Labaik* Pakistan (TLP).

The primary motive was against France's view on freedom of speech and radical Islam, concerning a blasphemous caricature published there and the events surrounding the murder of Samuel Paty, a French middle school teacher. The demonstrators demanded boycott of French goods and the expulsion of the French ambassador.

The protests intensified across Pakistan after the party's leader *Saad Hussain Rizvi* was arrested on 12 April 2021. It ended on 20 April 2021 after Rizvi was discharged and when the expulsion of the French envoy was discussed in the parliament and now all seem like there never was a storm.

It all started as on 11 April 2021, *Saad Rizvi* released a video message asking TLP activists to launch protests across Pakistan if the government did not expel the French ambassador from the country by 20 April. On 12 April, after *Rizvi* was arrested in Lahore charged under Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (ATA). This angered protesters, causing widespread unrest. Protests broke out across the country, with TLP activists blocking transport routes and cutting off cities including Lahore, Dina, Islamabad, Peshawar and Gujranwala from each other.

The protests turned violent with reports of stone pelting; at least two people were killed in the riots on 12 April. In addition, TLP claimed that two protesters were shot dead in Faisalabad and Karachi. Later, a TLP spokesperson said that at least four people were killed, hundreds were injured and thousands were arrested by the police.

On 13 April, one police officer was beaten to death by the rioting mob in Lahore, while 40 others were injured. TLP spokesperson *Tayyab Rizvi* claimed that the number of TLP workers "martyred" in the protests by the second day had increased to 12.

Punjab Police later confirmed that two cops were killed by the protesters who used clubs, bricks and firearms to attack them. Paramilitary forces were brought in to assist the local police across various cities including Lahore, Gujranwala, Dina, Rawalpindi and Bahawalpur.

The Pakistan government banned the TLP on 15th April, accusing them of terrorism as their protestors had engaged in street violence and attacked public law enforcers. However, the ban did not enable the Pakistani government to entirely dissolve the political party, for which it needs a mandate for the Pakistani Supreme Court.

Government temporarily banned social media for four hours on April 16th in an attempt to curb the protests, as the TLP held wide social media penetration. Later, it banned coverage of the TLP by local media.  On the same day, the government released an alleged statement by *Saad Rizvi*, asking protestors to stand down and peacefully disperse.

But several demonstrators expressed their disbelief in the statement, insisting on seeing or hearing it coming from Rizvi himself.  TLP activists in Britain staged a protest near the Pakistan High Commission in London on 16th April, but were later dispersed by the local police.

On 18 April, the police claimed that the TLP had taken six security personnel hostage in Lahore, including a senior police officer and two paramilitary soldiers. Later that day, Interior Minister said that 11 policemen who were taken hostage by TLP had been released after negotiations between Government of Punjab and TLP.

**Aftermath and Reactions**

Meanwhile France advised its citizens and French companies to temporarily leave Pakistan due to the violent protests' strong Francophobic nature. However, several French nationals refused to leave the country, stating that the threats were from TLP radicals, but not from ordinary citizens.

An anonymous Pakistani diplomat speaking to the French newspaper, Le Figaro, said that their country's [Pakistan's] international reputation was deteriorating due the actions of the TLP. Pakistani Taliban came out in support of TLP protesters and stated, **"we will make [the government] accountable for every drop of the martyrs' blood."**

The Government has reportedly reached an agreement with TLP to end the protests and the government has agreed to table a resolution regarding the expulsion of the French ambassador in the national assembly.

As part of the agreement, TLP Chief *Saad Hussain Rizvi* is likely to be soon. TLP member *Shafiq Amini* led to culmination of all demonstrators to disperse and keep the peace. However, the government so far has refused to lift the ban on the organization.

1. **POLICE RESPOND**

Responding to a law and order is normal police obligation. Handling processions and protests rallies is regular feature of daily tasking. However religious rallies becomes challenge as it is normally charged with passion. Police has responded in mix manner initially. At the inception, they seemed improvised.

Overnight arrest of TLP leader in background that he has announced to march to Islamabad created commotion and gave opportunity to their other tiers of TLP leadership to take to street. Caught in between the protestor agitation, government will and leadership stance placed the force on the left foot. Thousands of police officials were badly beaten with serious injuries.

Subsequently police responded with heavy hand after many police officers were kidnapped. In process two officers were martyred. Thousands of police officers were wounded. Finally hundreds of TLP protestors were arrested. Major scuffle took place at the last blockade near TLP madrasah. Two TLP agitators succumbed to injuries. Things seem to have settle down for a while, as government has negotiated to TLP and its other supporters.

1. **PREVAILING PREDICAMENT**

At the very onset department tell their force that the official transport will take them to the spot. They still however come on their motorbikes and park them near the activists. When retreat, the first motorcycles that get burnt are police. As they try to save their bikes and they are caught by the protestors.

Police Supervisor tire out our men by placing them near the protestors for hours and days at times without any action. At times they start buying the narrative of the protestors and when action starts they go in halfheartedly. Plan deployment without keeping retreat in mind. The equipment slows down the men and they end up in the hands of the protestors.

There usually are no clear directions from the government as to what kind of measures be adopted and the confusion makes the situation worse. There are always strict instructions that men should not have weapons and only anti-riot equipment be used. When the situation turns violent our anti-riot equipment doesn’t work

The men need to identify with the officers. Though now at many places officers lead from the front and stay with their men but the relationship needs to be stronger than that particular day. If they spend more time with these men otherwise as well, on regular basis and develop a relationship, force shall stay put behind their officer in charge and not abandon.

Many tiers of police officers have a tendency of joining duty passing through the mob. This should not happen at any cost as they usually end up taken hostage or beaten Many of our men are at times are sympathizers of the protestors. They guide agitators on police plans and tactics to overcome strategy.

Police security orders for deployment are frequently leaked to the media and the protestors know about what police have planned way before they are implemented. All anti-riots training should be based on ground realities. Due to lack of anti-riot equipment and training police officers resort to use of firearms. Police can only discourage such use of weapon once force is confident that their anti-riot equipment are sufficient to handle any such crowd.

1. **DEPLOYMENT HITCHES**

Police deployment focus is still on number of deployed force as compared to number of rioters instead of skilled force. Additional force is usually sent from reserve (many a times personnel is gathered a night before) which has no commitment or responsibility towards law and order situation. Usually, there are problems of getting force from police stations.

There is no segregation of personnel according to age group. That’s why police witness the injured police personnel from each age group. Aged are more likely to be made hostage in the hands of mob. Operational tactics and maneuvering is usually having text book approach. These don’t respond to ever changing trends and situations of mob

Police force is not sure about actual use of right of use of force and is fearful of consequences in the absence of clear political resolve and because of history of victimization. There is no operational and tactical dissection of major events even by R&D branches for guidance in future course of action. Success stories are applauded on electronic and social media, failures end up in the corridors of judicial enquiry.

Sometimes, such situations are considered as a break to test or exhaust expired stored anti-riot equipment’s including tear gas shells. In reality gadgets must be service worthy. If multi-agency cooperation is a permanent feature for mob - handling, that cooperation should not be demonstrated on D Day all the times. Mob handling simulation exercises are equally important for supervisory ranks.

It has been observed that despite training the actual performance by the police mob control force is quite different & they practically respond to such situation contrarily. Briefing by senior officers appears to be lacking & there is no clarity as to limits of use of force.

1. **PROGNOSIS**

Diagnosis of weak areas is an essential starting point for any prescription for mob/riot control. The recent TLP brutalization of police personnel resulted due to individual officers getting caught by the mob. Anti-riot police must act as a strong united body operating in numbers rather than individuals.

The spike of police response is moving between two extremes: to kill or get killed. The incumbent Commanders should form a Committee of Serving and Retired officers/Experts to chalk out comprehensive Policy. Not providing proper training is our failure and leadership at the lower/middle level is missing, where police was allowed to disperse and then got caught to get the lashing of the crowd.

It is sad the Police casualties helped the Government ride on the sympathy wave and take the strong decisions that ultimately helped castrate the perpetrators of *Fisad-fil-Ard.* The policy of IGP not to allow use of firearms by the police was a great decision, otherwise the sympathy wave would have turned otherwise, and police would have lost our high moral ground.

Video footages of recent failures and drubbings be shown over and over again to our units to bring about that perfection in their delivery. But having said that, gone are the days when a dedicated unit in the police lines was ready to move on just one whistle. These days officers in districts tend to ignore the importance of such a unit and emphasize more on giving maximum man power to the police stations. This needs to be changed and a dedicated ARF needs to be present 24/7 or at least 12/7.

In actual situations, the encounter can be very messy and disorganized, but the police MUST try their best to act as a formation and one body. That would minimize harm. When the crowd is armed one cannot deploy unarmed units for controlling them. They should be armed with 12 Bore guns and ammunition with small pallets to avoid lethal injuries. Instead of multiple fancy units, police must build sizeable anti-riot reserves to deal with unruly crowds.

Officers who conducted operations in the recent past like Model Town, *Dharna* of PTI (M.A.N), TLP *Dharna* I, II and III should share their experiences to improve police actions;

1. **LESSONS LEARNT**

The senior leadership must undergo general training throughout their career (STP, MCC, SMC and NMC). Anti-riot and Mob control is highly specialized job to be conducted by only highly trained, well equipped special police units with clear rules of engagement. Throughout the globe law enforcement and anti-riot job need special skillset visibly absent rather irrelevant in our case. This is yet another wake up call for police leadership to realize that specializations is the name of the game now. The world’s best practices are only a click away.

Leadership should analyze the weak areas of police response to recent agitations which need improvement and accordingly revise SOP. Detailed action as per Police rules need to be studied and updated as per recent experiences.

Methodology to tackle will have to be different for religiously motivated unruly and charged crowd as compared to politically planned agitation. Duties have to be detailed with fully fit force physically. Deploying old and unfit personnel to fill the strength is counterproductive.

There should be a women contingent to handle ladies sit-in. They should be given proper training in anti-riot as it is often witnessed that police response in such cases in not well organized and lacks coordination. With all training, practices and equipment usage, police cannot succeed, unless they have legal and constitutional protection to deal with illegal assemblies and mobs.

Most of the officers are tangled and over taken by the fear of being booked in FIR or facing an inquiry. Section 22-A and 22-B had caused a tremendous loss to police force. Organization should highlight and should get passed a law for legal protection to cover for such situations.

If only the arrested persons could be tried and convicted within a month, as was done during the London riots, one would not see such defiance of law. Keeping all other factors constant, appropriate and sufficient strength is the key in successful handling of any agitation; this was obvious during the current handling of law and order in Punjab. In some districts police initially did operations with insufficient strengths and couldn’t succeed. Later on after mustering more strength police cleared the same agitation quite comfortably.

Assurance of legal protection to police officers dealing with such situations against prosecution as provided under section 132(a) of Cr.PC is important. An Anti-violent crimes Act is required as a special law, as current PPC sections are not enough to deter savories; Such Act should define protest, and categorize riot, violent riot, crime to attack police and penalties for it, It should give police powers to seize material brought on roads by violent mobs and only police to give NOC for legal protests;

Public Order handling should be taught to supervisory officers in NPA and Police Colleges for understanding of PPW for better crime control. Law & Order (Public Order) be given primacy over Crime Management in postings/ transfer and police performance review meetings, which are currently called “Crime Meetings”.

Technology can be of great help to identify people in the mob. IMSI catchers are available in the market. NRTC is also making IMSI catchers. They can record all active SIMs/ IMSIs in a particular area. These can be used to identify mobile/ cell phone users present in any particular area at any particular time. These can later on identified and arrested being part of the protesting mob.

Preventive detentions are a far better strategy than a confrontation against a proscribed militant organization. Detaining *Saad Rizvi* of TLP before they could converge at *Faizabad* was a wise move. A policy of restraint and minimum use of force is far better than indiscriminate and violent use of force by police.

An intelligence-based proactive strategy is needed to foil the designs of militant organizations that want to create chaos. Placing their activists and office-bearers in Schedule-IV of ATA and going for preventive detentions will put them on the defensive.

All Provincial Special Branches should comprehensively prepare report against proscribed organizations like TLP who have registered themselves as political party. Such reports would be useful for use by the government before ECP and SC.

The Local Police with the full support of SBs and IB must remain well aware and well ahead of the Modus Operandi of these miscreant elements. Police must initiate all the necessary, preventive and all the post Operation Legal Actions, to defeat Miscreants’ Plans and unlawful Operations.

Despite being given the equipment, many troops try to avoid wearing the anti-riot gear. When not wearing a helmet/ jacket, they flee at the sight of first incoming stone or stick. If the protective gear is worn, it gives one confidence and strength. Noncompliance is purely a failure of supervisory level. Upper subordinates should be responsible to ensure use of gear. Commanders should lead by example by wearing full anti-riot gear. The tendency of not wearing gear is especially higher in make-shift platoons from police stations.

Mobs thrive on the outcome of first onslaught. If the police forward line is able to withstand the first thrust by the mob, there are all chances that police will be able to push them back/ make them run for life. To ensure that police forward line is able to withstand first push, presence of commander is of crucial value. Maintaining formations and proper use of shields is secondly. Greater our personal understanding with troops, greater is the probability of their putting up a good standing by.

Mob handling is a team effort. No individual heroics work is required. Apart from formations, there must be a buddy or group system. Every individual must know that there is someone watching his back. This buddy system binds the men together, giving them courage and morale. For men in anti-riot force, the certainty of serving for a tenure helps.

In riot handling, centralization is not going to make police capable of responding to the situations effectively. For example Anti-riot force unit stationed at Lahore cannot move to any far-flung district well in time, except if there is any air source available, as during such situations roads get blocked. Therefore, every district Unit under the command of DPO should have its own capable anti- riot unit with equipment’s.

Police Rashness and aggression has its ills. Restraint and respect for protesters is crucial.

Remember

**“Passions is the mob of the man, that commits a riot upon his reason”**

(William Penn)

Constructive and conducive manner engagement diffuses situations. Effective measures must be taken in case of their irrationality. Police should have legal protection for their just actions. As they fall prey eventually for political expediency in case of collateral damage. As per spirit of CRPC police officials cannot be criminally charged for what he does in discharge of his duties in good faith. It is suggested “Police Officers’ Bill of Rights” as was done in 20th century in USA be enacted.

1. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

For effective handling of law and order situation following are essential:

* 1. **Negotiations**

1. Negotiations and talks to minimize use of force and confrontation to be prioritized.
2. Each DPO, SDPO and SHO must have few influential local elders in each area to be used for negotiations or mediators. Direct talks by police officers accredited officers also helps.
3. Overall police behavior and services throughout calendar year must be public friendly to build better image which helps in success of talks when such protests erupts.
   1. **Confident Force**

Police force shall be effective only when they know that their leaders are behind them. Inaction or indecisiveness demoralizes force.

Further, they should be sure that in case of any harm to their person, they and their families will be looked after. Moreover, at times things can get nasty; due to political exigencies, the men are sacrificed at the altar, they should be sure that in case they have acted as per law, during those trouble times, they would not be left unattended, and they will be looked after especially financially, and every legal help would be extended.

* 1. **Clear Orders**

The order should be lawful, clear and well pronounced. They should be in writing, and every detail should be included. It will give clarity of action.

In the heat of battle, errors happen. In case of errors, the commander should be brave enough to own them. It is a tall order, but it can reap a lot of results.

This should be followed with legal action ensuring swift punishments for future deterrence. Training and resources can only produce results if there is clarity in directions to officers on ground.

* 1. **Amenities during the action**

Police units beprovided best protection anti - riot gears like water cannons, APCs, tear gas, rubber bullets and drones etc. to enhance their capability.

1. Every district should sufficient anti-riot equipment’s with earmarked force. Proper anti-riot gears/ gadgets must be available in each PS
   1. **Anti-riot Training & drills**
2. The men should be trained with ascribed standards, and drills.
3. Periodic drills of tactics to deal with sit-ins, roadblocks, unruly mobs and strike calls at HQs are a must.
4. The SDPO must supervise weekly rehearsal of protest handling in each PS.
5. There should be a specialized training school for anti-riot staff at Provincial Level.
6. Police Lines Training Schools should be active all the times.
7. Make ROEs into SOPs, drill and rehearse.
8. Human rights and application of force must be part of training module for ARF
   1. **Separate section to deal**
9. Anti-riot police should be organized in sections of 10 individuals with one upper subordinate as in charge and they must remain together, no matter what, in any given law and order situation or when trying to disperse mob and as they follow the retreating crowds. They should all be groups, each knowing other by name, to enable highest level of espirit de corps and stand for each other when caught in an adverse situation.
10. There is a need to raise specialized ARF at each district level which should not be deployed other than law and order situation. One unit of ARF should always be available with Range DIG for reinforcement if need arises.
11. Minimum DSP should be the commander on spot.
12. All Districts should maintain units of Rapid response force for spontaneous protests. These would act as first responders. The Rapid response force should assess the situation and engage the crowd if it is small enough to be safely managed by them. Under no circumstances should the first responders mingle with the crowd. First responders RRF should pass on their assessment to Police Control and back up force should be sent from the District Anti-Riot Force in the shortest possible time. RRF should secure the area and divert traffic.
13. A well trained and well equipped Anti-Riots Force must be raised in each district under the command of an SP Public Order. Initially, various platoons from the provincial constabularies should be formally transferred to the districts, retrained and equipped to meet emerging challenges.
14. Instead of calling Rangers or FC in aid of police, every province has a well-armed and effective Constabulary which may be used as a back-up force in case of armed resistance by violent protestors. However, care must be taken not to use the Elite Police in riot situations.
    1. **Proper mob/crowd assessment**
       1. Ascertain status of mob i.e. its tenor.
       2. Inform the control
       3. Ascertain classification i.e. whether Political, religious, aggrieved, students, labor, civil society, social walks and rallies etc.
    2. **Do’s and Don’ts**
    3. Attack on tail because they are least motivated
    4. Keep all options of force available
    5. Utmost care to be done while using any force against the mob
    6. Guard sensitive points which may fall in the way of dispersing crowd
    7. Retreat should be systematic
    8. Train the police officers about escalation and de-escalation of situation
    9. Proportional use of force (according to resistance put up by the mob
    10. Do not exchange insults with the crowd
    11. Do not use force on arrested participants
    12. Do not beat to punish
    13. Torture on spot by policemen on public that usually gets captured on camera to be avoided by local commanders.
    14. Members of Anti-riot Police always to work in groups and never go solo in hot pursuit against miscreants lest they become victims of mob violence.
    15. Minimum force be used as most of the protesters are innocent.
    16. Males should not handle females
    17. The force in plain clothes should not use force or carry weapons
    18. If firearms is to be used identify the targets and do not fire indiscriminately
    19. Do not use force when police contingent is weak in strength
    20. Intelligence and information gathering must be efficient
    21. Arrest of the mob leaders to be done if the protest goes violent.
    22. For temporary protests carried for genuine reasons, it must be dealt with empathy.
    23. Always arrest/detain the local leaders when information of a protest is received.
    24. Deploy in big formations.
    25. Use public address system
    26. Anti-riot police are not supposed to follow the crowds for arrest. They must know exactly their role which is to keep roads clear, contain the rioters and restrict their activities.
    27. Arrest and transport teams must be separate that can move in and out of the scene.
    28. All activity must be reported to the nearest control for any help or further support.
    29. Dedicated video recording be done for effective prosecution later on.
    30. Injured protesters must be given first aid by police ambulance available on spot or be evacuated to nearest hospital by the police.
    31. **Information and Intelligence**
15. Details regarding number, gender, leaders, mood, grievances, slogans, ‎weapons, ‎vehicles, direction, purpose, target,‎ chances of clash with rival group, history of such type of ‎crowd and type of area should be available
16. Counter rumors effectively through different means‎
    1. **Different Formations to tackle situations**
       1. Column formation
       2. Skirmish line (contain the crowd)‎
       3. Wedge formation (Penetrate and divide the crowd)‎
       4. Add to the formations the following separate teams:
          * Tear gas
          * Water cannon
          * Rubber bullets
          * Firearm team.
       5. Deploy Ambulances along with anti-riot formations.
    2. **Resource Support Cell**
       1. A senior and experienced officer helped by experience upper subordinates should ‎be made to plan and calculate requirements of human resource and equipment. It should be continuously updated.
       2. Keep track of supply and demand.‎
       3. Team to provide equipment and food
       4. Media center to handle the media
       5. Social media campaign before and after be launched for justification of police response.
       6. Protection of police and other sensitive/ vulnerable public and private property should be ensured
       7. Backup of fresh personnel should be available
       8. Plan for prolonged public disorder
       * Provision of different color arm bands to specify the area of deployment during deployment phase.
       * Every team should have designated team leaders with designated call signs and on one communication link.
    3. **Different Contingents**
       1. Prisoner escort party
       2. Protection of police offices
       3. Documentation of all processes and lessons learnt
       4. Video making
    4. **Verbal and Written abuse**

* + 1. Anticipate both verbal and written abuse. The purpose of this tactic is to anger and ‎demoralize law enforcement and cause them to take individual actions that may later ‎be exploited as "police brutality."

‎

* + 1. Cater for looting by the dispersing crowd
    2. Use of force should be reasonable, necessary and lawful
  1. **Strategic Moves**
  2. Consider isolating the leaders from the crowd
  3. Arresting those who are not in form of groups
  4. Disrupting the communication system
  5. Distracting attention of the crowd
  6. Do not let the crowd gather in big number
  7. Controlling the transport
  8. Operation in the catchment areas
  9. **Extra care to deal with challenging groups**
  10. Advocates
  11. Religious leaders
  12. Politicians: ruling and opposition
  13. Relatives of a person died in custody
  14. Labor unions
  15. **Evaluate your strength**
  16. Force integrity and reputation of fairness
  17. The length of your stay
  18. Government’s policy
  19. Your standing in the society
  20. Your relations with judiciary
  21. Your relations with the police and LEAs
  22. Authority inherent in your post
  23. The resources available with you
  24. Loyalty of your subordinates with you
  25. **Evaluate their strength**
  26. Support available to the adversary
  27. Emotional appeal of their narrative
  28. Criticality of their holdup
  29. The number of the protesters
  30. Capacity of the opposition to continue
  31. Trust of the followers in the leadership
  32. Integrity of the leadership
  33. Weather conditions
  34. Penetration of opposition in your rank and file
  35. **Coping with Pressure Tactics**
      1. The opponents do not want to negotiate
      2. Put extra pressure on you to make a quick decision
      3. Stay calm and go slow during such conditions
      4. You should know how adrenal glands can play havoc
      5. The opponents will also be under similar pressure
      6. Have a plan for the use of force
      7. You must have updated intelligence about the opponents
      8. Make a SWOT analysis of your force
      9. Make a SWOT analysis of the opponent
      10. If possible wait for the best time to strike
      11. Try to create difference of opinion among opponents
      12. Have the possible repercussions in mind
      13. Be mindful of ensuing judicial review
      14. Do not use half-hearted force
      15. Do not use your private force
  36. **Estimating Numbers**
  37. Tightly Packed (Approx. 5 persons per square yard)‎
  38. Medium Packed (Approx. 3 persons per square yard)‎
  39. Loosely Packed ‎‎ (Approx. 1 person per square yard)
  40. **Briefings and Debriefings**

Briefing/ debriefing session must be conducted every time the force goes out for mob control

1. **BOTTOM-LINE**

**“Justice is incidental to law and order”**

With country ranking indicators sliding, prevalence of serious governance issues, house being run in disorderly manner, confusion prevails in society stemming dissatisfaction, mistrust and conflict. This uncertainty is brewing strain, fear and unease.

The Police department needs a full-fledged Intelligence system, to internally cleanse the force of any sympathizers, (Pattern of MI) but also report and analyze on emerging threats. The role of SP Br is insufficient, under resourced and under mandated. With the capability of doing wonder the Special branch is grossly underutilized.

Likelihood of more violent groups protesting and being given leverage is not over-ruled. Hence Police leadership must speak out rather plan, strategize to keep themselves abreast on all accounts to effectively respond safeguarding their organization working, force welfare in crisis and its functional mandate of protecting citizens life, property and honor.

It is unfortunate that police usually evades to act against the conspiracy, its players, financiers, sponsors, and social media influencers after such wide spread protests. This lets the hydra perpetrate.

The culture of compromises, mostly initiated by governments, has to be done away with. Rule of Law can only flourish then.